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THE FINANCING OF PUBLIC WORKS: LOCAL
GOVERN MENTS
CURRENT REVENUE AND BORROWING
THE RELATIVE proportions in which public improvements in
the United States are financed from current revenue and
through borrowing vary greatly from city to city and almost
as much between different states, counties, school districts
and other civil divisions. While some cities, such as New York
and Buffalo, generally finance their outlays almost entirely
or very largely from the proceeds of bond sales, others, like
Boston, have inclined towards a pay-as-you-go policy.
situation is similar with respect to states: the greater portion
of the public works expenditures of New York are financed
from current revenue, although the state also borrows ex-
tensively for this purpose; on the other hand, Michigan had
no recourse to long-term obligations during 1924—33 for any
purpose other than refunding.
Generally, during the post-War period, the rate of increase
in outlays for public works by states tended to exceed the
proportional expansion of tax revenues. This trend is indi-
cated in Table 83. Moreover, outlays constituted an increasing
proportion of total governmental cost payments during this
period (see Table 84). From these data one might infer that
the states experienced a growing need for borrowing to finance
public works.
States differed, too, in the amounts of available current
revenue for purposes other than ordinary operation expend i-
tures. Thus in 1926, most states, after meeting operation and
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TABLE 83
PERCENTAGE INCREASE OVER 1915 IN REVENUE RECEIPTS AND




YEAR RECEIPTSMAINTENANCEINTEREST OUTLAYS1 TOTAL
1917 14.1 12.4 14.1 —28.7 4.6
1919 47.4 43.0 29.8 —25.3 29.4
1922 153.0 141.6 122.7 234.1 158.7
1924 199.0 165.6 201.1 367.8 205.8
1926 261.3 175.3 314.5 413.0 226.2
1928 322.4 219.5 368.7 514.0 281.7
1930 389.5 267.3 446.9 728.6 362.8
193! 407.3 282.0 497.5 889.4 406.9
Source: Financial Statistics of States, 1931
IOutlaysinclude expenditures for land, purchases for museums, equipment, etc., as
well as construction.
TABLE 84
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL-COST
PAYMENTS BY STATES, 1915-1931
FISCAL OPERATION AND INTEREST
YEAR MAINTENANCE CHARGES OUTLAYS
1915 77.0 3.7 19.2
1917 82.8 4.1 13.1
1919 85.1 3.8 11.1
1922 71.9 3.2 24.8
1924 66.9 3.7 29.8
1926 65.0 4.8 30.2
1928 64.5 4.6 30.9
1930 61.1 4.4 34.4
1931 58.1 4.4 37.5
Source: Financial Statistics of States
interest charges, had unused balances of from 20 tO 35 per
cent of their tax receipts that could be utilized for outlays.
During the next three years, certain states, for example, Ar-
kansas and Mississippi, found negligible proportions of their
receipts available for outlays, while others, such as Delaware,
Nebraska, and some of the New England States, had almost296 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
half of their receipts so available.' During the first two years
of the depression those states which had not achieved margins
of this kind found two major difficulties in financing outlays.
The widespread tendency of current expenditures to exceed
current income prevented any large expenditure on outlays.
Furthermore, the impaired credit rating caused by unbalanced
budgets retarded the possibility of negotiating extensive loans
for outlays. On the other hand, those states which had large
unused margins that could be used for public works found it
relatively easy to borrow for the same purpose.
The tabulation indicates the percentage of municipal long-
term debt incurred respectively for public works and other
purposes.2 Although greatly below the usual level, public
works still constituted more than half of the total in 1932.
PURPOSE 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Public works 93.3494.7995.09 92.80 88.io58.3938.93
Refunding 1.34 .89 1.98 2.26 4.21i8.go
Funding 2.29 2.46 1.51 3.57 4.8310.2410.35
Miscellaneous 3.03 i.86 1.42 1.27 2.86 12.47 43.61
Includes 37.97 per cent for relief.
The decline, furthermore, is not as severe as it appears at first
sight. In view of the marked increase in refunding operations,
which are merely an expedient for reducing the cost of pre-
viously incurred long-term debt and do not represent the
assumption of new debt, public construction has remained
the chief purpose of the issue of long-term obligations. Issues
for relief purposes and the funding of short-term notes explain
the reduced proportion represented by public works. The
See Financial Statistics of States, U.S. Bureauof the Census, for the years
mentioned. The definitions and classifications used in these publications are
of so special a character that only the most general conclusions may be
drawn concerning the relation of borrowing to other forms of income and
concerning the nature of construction outlay tendencies.
2Stateand Municipal Compendium, June 1933, and Commercial and
dal Chronicle, May 19, 1934.LOCAL FINANCING 297
startlingly low level of permanent loans for public improve-
ment in 1933,shownin the tabulation, is a misleading sum-
mary. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle includes in
its data only those loans made through the ordinary borrowing
channels; loans made by the Federal government through the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Public Works
Administration have been excluded. It is likely, therefore,
that the relative proportion of long-term bonds for public
works was at least as great as in the preceding year.
RELATION BETWEEN THE COST AND VOLUME OF MUNICIPAL
BORROWING
The aggregate volume of long-term indebtedness con-
tracted annually by local governments throughout the country
has in the past been very large, as may be seen from Table
85, and until the depression showed every sign of continuing
to be so. The trend of municipalborrowing since the close
of the War has been markedly upward. In particular, distinc-
tively state bonds, which in pre-War years made their appear-
ance at such infrequent intervals and in such relatively small
volume that it was thought they might become altogether
extinct, and which in early post-War years largely took the
form of soldiers' bonus bonds, have been put out in heavily
increased amounts in recent years. The exemption of such
bonds from Federal taxation has contributed to their sal-
ability.
Consequently conditions of the money and investment
markets, and especially the cost of municipal borrowing,
have been and are matters of direct and considerable mo-
ment to local governmental agencies and enter as a factor
In keeping with common usage the term 'municipal' is employed through-
out this chapter to designate obligations put out not only by cities, but also
by states, counties, school and other districts and the various minor civil
governmental units, unless the contrary is expressly stated.298 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
TABLE 85




OF CITIES HAVING AMOUNT OF AMOUNT OF
POPULATION LONG-TERM SHORT-TERM TOTAL AMOUNT
YEAR 30,000 ANDOVER1 BONDS ISSUED2 BONDS ISSUED2 NEW BONDS2
1918 $79' $263 $473 $736
1919 875 770 450 1,220
1920 8972 774 664 1,438
192! 919 i,383 762 2,145
1922 1,441 1,280 396 1,675
1923 1485 1,135 514 1,649
1924 1,617 1,447 979 2,426
£925 1,736 1,405 866 2,271
1926 1,901 1,362 66i 2,023
1927 2,047 1478 625 2,103
1928 2,164 1,390 717 2,107
1929 2,110 1,442 921 2,363
1930 3,379 1,383 - 952 2,335
1931 1,252 1,087 2,339
£932 937 1,092 2,029
'933
6 1,164 986 2,150
'U.S. Bureau of the Census, Findnciat Statistics of Cities.
2TheBond Buyer, Municipal Bond Sales.
Interpohted figure.
'U. S. Bureau of the Census, Financial Statistics of City Governments, 1931(Reportof
May £933).
No report issued. Estimate based upon sample of tax receipts of fifty representative
cities expressed as ratio of tax receipts of same cities in 1930.
8Noreport issued.
of Cardinal importance into their public works programs.
This is likely to be particularly so in periods of depression,
when the incentive to provide emergency funds for public
construction through borrowing rather than from tax re-
ceipts is so much the stronger in consequence of reduced
current revenue and the difficulty and undesirability of
raising tax rates. It is true that municipal improvements are
frequently financed in the first instance by temporary bor-
rowing and that these obligations need not be converted into
long-term indebtedness until more favorable money marketLOCAL FINANCING 299
conditionswarrant the step.4 Indeed, in periods of tight
money, when local governments are forced to pay a high
price for their credit, the tendency is to attempt to substi-
tute short-term loans for long-term obligations and to reduce
the total volume of borrowing until easier conditions have
returned. The volume and distribution of borrowing during
is a good case in point. Although was stjll
largely part of the prosperity era, the lucrative opportunities
of the stock market reduced the desirability of bonds, and
the relatively high cost of long-term borrowing was one of
the chief causes of the increase, by more than $200,000,000,
in short-term loans over the preceding year. Lower credit
prices for the following year and a half bolstered the total
volume of borrowing, but the menacing turn of events in
the latter part of 1931 and in 1932, and the simultaneous
rise in basic yields, had their effects on both the volume
and distribution of borrowing. Total obligations dropped
$110,000,000 from 1931 to 1932; at the same time the aggre-
gate of long-term bonds declined $315,000,000,andalthough
temporary loans were only $5,000,000morethan in 1931,
theyexceeded permanent debt incurred in 1932by$i15,-
ooo,ooo.That this expedient of substituting short- for long-
term borrowing somewhat reduced, but did not wholly
remove, the financial problem involved is indicated by the
rise in funding and refunding operations. A loose but per-
sistent relation exists between the cost of borrowing and the
amount of new municipal indebtedness incurred.
The manner in which adverse conditions of the money
and investment markets act as a check at times amounting
to a veritable embargo on the flotation of new bond issues
by municipalities, and how, conversely, favorable conditions
encourage the issue of obligations, cannot be better illus-
trated than by tracing the course of events during 1928—33.
This is conspicuously so in the case of New York City; see Ch. VIII.300 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
Repressive influences leading to monetary stringency and bond
congestion first developed during the latter half of 1928.The
steadily growing attractiveness of the stock exchange call loan
market diverted large amounts of the surplus cash of individuals
and corporations away from investment in low-rate securities such
as municipal bonds. The difficulty of disposing of new offerings
which developed during July, August and September is reflected
in the unusually low ebb to which bond issues fell for these three
months, as may be seen from Table 86. The November and
TABLE 86
TOTALSTATE AND MUNICIPAL ISSUES OF
LONG- AND SHORT-TERM BONDS, UNITED STATES, 1928-1933
(in thousands)
LONG-TERM BONDS
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932' 1933a
January $73,351$92,184$49,977$135,154 $85,930
February 132,725 88,753 78,740 35,310 64,951
March 132,897 109,056127,028279,443 87,996 45,573
April 129,861 87,343 148,956iii,386 66,671 58,579
May 141,285 179,456142,448 169,094 85,396 53,925
June 137,213 162,168153,699 120,336 85,588 107,905
July 75,886 86,745 111,657 85,327 30,362
August 78,445 80,415 98,514 75,618 47,568 111,393
September 70,170 100,257 79,578 119,142 82,737 68,368
October 98,233 122,346 158,381 18,293 67,178 95,600
November 173,824 65,974 93,982 54,322 47,726 129,750
December 116,141 286,517 97,703 49,244 165,167304,687
Annual total $1,389,819 $1,442,381 $1,382,870 $1,251,771$936,853$1,164,492
SHORT -TERM BONDS
7928 1929 7930 7931 7932 7933
January $73,320$114,675$96,779 $81,697$tii,oi8$105,173
February 113,389 71,749 81,724238,686 100,757 77,389
March 75,359 55,411 102,040 64,979 174,948 92,719
April 78,001 105,141 83,074 118,077 172,948
May 14,896 6o,ii8 24,614 24,772 45,386 105,037
June 44,621 48,109 69,742 30,892 124,685210,783
July 57,014 59,321 153,067 45,602 46,032 13,916
August 63,543 86,164 26406 91,522 74,368 16,858
September 73,419 95,978 76,501 104,129 8i,688 43,006
October 82,552 99,505 81,222 50,122 28,928 53,830
November 14,496 74,187 80422 74,625 40,589 21,376
December 26,183 50,624 76,531 83,142 145,590 72,583
Annual total$716,793$920,982$952,122 $1,086,766 $1,092,066
Source: The Bond Buyer, Municipal Bond Sales
*Includesloans from the RFC.
2Includesloans from the RFC and PWA.LOCAL FINANCING 301
December issues of that year resumed normal proportions be-
cause municipal authorities met the new situation by making
their obligations more attractive through raising the rates offered.
Yet the total volume of new issues for the year as a whole was
less than in 1927—$1,39o,000,000 as compared with $1,474,000,000.
In 1929 the tension increased despite the offer of higher
rates. The continued and increased absorption of surplus funds
by the stock market and the investment trusts, and the upward
flight of rates, severely restricted municipal borrowing. Towards
the end of March 1929 call money rates on the New York Stock
Exchange rapidly advanced from 12 to 15, 17 and finally 20 per
cent. These influences were of course greatly modified in the
closing months of the year, after and as a result of the stock market
collapse. But though bond sales in December aggregated a very
unusual being heavier in amount than during any single
month the results for the entire year were not sub-
stantially affected. It is not surprising, therefore, that the aggre-
gate volume of new state and municipal issues, which had
declined in 1928 from the level reached in 1927, showed no great
recovery in 1929.
The explanation for even such recovery as occurred, despite
increasingly adverse conditions, is found in the inability which
many states and municipalities experienced in 1929 to delay
further in making needed issues which had already been post-
poned. When the bond market began to decline in the spring of
1928,afterprices had reached their highest level in twenty years, a
considerable amount of borrowing was postponed in the belief
that within a few months bonds would again be in active demand.
In many instances short-term loans were arranged running for
six, nine or twelve months. When, however, after a reasonable
delay, the market showed no sign of an early revival, this post-
This, however, was chiefly due to a few very large offerings of bonds made
this month, conspicuously one of $13o,loo,ooo by New York City (of which
$65,100,000 were sold to the city's sinking fund); $41,000,000 by the city and
county of San Francisco; and $24,266,000 by Detroit. These three issues alone
constituted more than half of the aggregate municipal bond sales made in
December throughout the country.302 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
poned borrowing was negotiated. Thus some of the 1929bor-
rowing actually represented financing which, under normal
conditions, would have been consummated during 1928.
Inmarked contrast to the two preceding years, conditions for
the flotation of municipal bonds in 1930wereon the whole
favorable. The easing of the money market, the drop in the charge
for loanable funds to unusually low levels, and the rapid decline
in value of other forms of investment, made municipal issues
once again attractive, except for a brief period during the closing
months of the year when the municipal bond market was seriously
demoralized in common with security markets generally. In these
circumstances, and particularly in view of the greatly decreased
costs at which municipalities were able to dispose of their offer-
ings, it is significant that the aggregate volume of new long-term
borrowing throughout the country declined to a lower level not
merely than in 1929butin any year since 1926.
The apparent immunity of municipal obligations to the effects
of the rapidly widening industrial depression caused an immedi-
ate revival of bond prices in January 1931.Thisrecovery was,
however, brief. In June municipals sold higher than at any time
in the preceding twenty years, but the combined effects of the
European financial crisis, followed by an exodus of American
gold, and the realization that municipal governments had been
affected by the industrial depression, brought a halt to this up-
ward trend. The total of municipal bond sales dropped to $76,-
ooo,ooo in August and rose again to $119,000,000 inSeptember.
This spurt was the result of two large state flotations, $40,000,000
ofNew York and $20,000,000ofNew Jersey bonds. During
October the municipal bond market was almost at a standstill;
while new issues amounted to only little more than $i8,ooo,ooo,
during the preceding ten years the aggregate par value of new
bonds issued in that month had never been less than $65,000,000.
Thechanged conditions were reflected in the cost of borrowing;
and the rise in basic yield rates acted as a deterrent to municipal
borrowing.
During 1932theadverse conditions of the latter half of 1931LOCAL FINANCING 303
were intensified. The demoralization of municipal credit con-
tinued unabated and increased the selective character of the bond
market. Consequently, many municipalities found themselves
unable to dispose of bonds and notes to cover maturities. Bank
failures, curtailed revenues, increased expenditures, and the
high cost of borrowing tended to accelerate defalcation and, con-
currently, to reduce the desirability of bonds and the ability to
assume the burden of increased long-term indebtedness.
The difficulties inobtainingpermanent ibansin..
creased the volume of temporary issues. In 1928 short-term issues
totaled $717,000,000; rn 1932, $1,092,000,000. This expedient
continued to be utilized in '933. The volume of long-term bonds
in 1932 is structurally different from that of preceding years since
it includes almost $i 13,000,000 of RFC loans for emergency relief
and self-liquidating projects.° If to this is added the increased
borrowing for refunding purposes, the precipitous decline in new
debt incurred through customary channels becomes obvious.
The municipal bond market continued to be poor in 1933.
Rates of borrowing were high, and increasing bond defaults and
bank failures aggravated the financial stringency. These deficien-
cies were to some extent offset by large loans from the RFC and
the PWA; of the permanent loans in 1933 approximately $532,-
ooo,ooo were sold to these two agencies.7 Throughout 1934 mu-
nicipal bonds rose sharply.
CThefigures given here are those appearing in the Quarterly Reports and
special releases of the RFC. These figures differ from those quoted by The
Bond Buyer for 1932, which are $17,000,000 for self-liquidating projects
and $112,000,000 for relief. For self-liquidating projects, the RFC totalis
probably correct because The Bond Buyer merely summarized loans as they
were reported by cities. Rescindments subsequent to authorizations, there-
fore, possibly account for the difference of $i,00o,000. The Bond Buyer
obtained its data for relief loans from various RFC reports, but the lack of
uniformity in RFC statements makes [or such confusion that it is impossible
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MUNICIPAL BORROWING AND MONEY MARKET CONDITIONS
The outstanding developments of the bond market during
1928—33, the marked decline in interest rates during the
eighteen months following the stock market collapse and
the wide variations in the cost of credit to different munici-
pal units following the break in the bond market in October
1931, are illustrated equally well by the changing costs at
which local governments did their borrowing over this pe-
riod. The experiences of New York City, recounted in Chap-
ter VIII, may be again touched upon and elaborated as an
instructive case in point. The tabulation summarizes the
details of bond issues floated by New York during 1928—33.
DATE AMOUNT COUPON RATE BASIC RATE
(in thousands) (per cent)
February29, 1928 $52,000 4 3.866
November 20, 1928 55,000 414 4.2002
May 20, 1929 52,000 51,4 4.8065
Decemberii., 1929 4'/2 4.351
October21, 1930 50,000 4 3.9986
March 4, 1931 100,000 41,4 4.134
May 12, 1931 52,000 3 2.997
January22, 1932 100,000 6 6.ooo
May ig, 1932 5,000 5¼ 5.500
November 20, 1933 70,000 414 4.500
Itwill be observed that between February 1928 and May 1929,
a period of fifteen months, the cost of borrowing to the city, as
represented by the basis on which its issues were sold, advanced
almost one per cent. llndeed, four months later, at the height of
the speculative fever, New York had to pay as much as 6 per cent
on its offerings of short-term notes. The release of funds effected
by the stock market collapse is reflected in the quickly reduced
interest basis on which the issue of December 1929wasdisposed
of. The further improvement which took place in 1930isshown
by the interest cost of the issue in October of that year. It is
worth recalling, however, that an offering of $75,000,000hadLOCAL FINANCING 305
originallybeen contemplated and that the Comptroller had found
it necessary to reduce this amount by a third because, despite the
easy money and ample bank credit available, bond prices were
sharing in the demoralization experienced by security markets
in general. In 1931,however,municipal bonds recovered their
appeal. The slightly higher basic cost to the city of its issue of
March 1931,ascompared with that of October 1930,isprobably
explained chiefly by the magnitude of the offering, the result
being considered highly gratifying by the Comptroller. The sale
effected in May 1931atan interest cost of 2.997percent, on the
other hand, marks, as pointed out in an earlier chapter, the lowest
interest basis at which the city has floated a bond issue since its
incorporation as Greater New York in 1898.
At the close of the year, however, New York City experienced
great difficulty in meeting current expenses. Curtailed revenue,
despite a rise in tax rates in 1931,extravagance,and increased
expenses for relief, resulted in a shortage of cash. This crisis,
which damaged the city's credit position, together with the gen-
eral stringency of the bond market, prevented the flotation of
new issues. After eliciting a promise from city officials that a num-
ber of budgetary economies would be effected, a banking group
of 46 members agreed to sell an issue of $ioo,ooo,ooo of 6 per
cent corporate stock notes maturing in three to five years. On
January 22,1932 thesenotes were offered at par accrued
interest. Thus within eight months the cost of credit to New
York City more than doubled. On May i8 another issue for only
$5,000,000ofbonds was sold to the Chase National and National
City Banks at a cost of 5.5 per cent. This extraordinary increase
in the price paid for money in 1932issufficient evidence of the
depreciation of the credit standing of New York City. The diffi-
culties encountered in selling long-term bonds alienated the
support of investment houses; consequently, on June i6, 1933
theBoard of Estimate adopted the Comptroller's plan to sell tax
anticipation loans and long-term bonds directly to the public.
On November 20,1933, thecity disposed of $70,000,000ofbonds306 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
to a group of New York banks including the Bankers Trust,
Chase National, First National and the Guaranty Trust. Despite
the size of the flotation, the issues were sold at a lower cost than
either of the two bond issues of the preceding year.
In direct contrast to the above example of diminished
prestige is the case of New York State. Its experience is illus-
trative of the facility with which certain state bonds could
be floated because of superior credit standing.
On December 14, 1932 New York State floated its only issue of
that year, $30,400,000 of bonds, at a basic cost of 3.027 per cent.
On June 28, .1933 it disposed of $26,595,000 of serial bonds at
2.936 per cent, which represented the best terms it had received
for 25 years. Even as late as October 24, 1933, it borrowed $29,000,-
ooo at a cost of only 3.437 per cent. These easy terms are espe-
cially significant in view of the fact that New York State is one
of the largest local borrowers. During this period Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania also found it relatively easy to borrow because
of their sound position.
The upward course of borrowing rates until November
1929, its reversal after that date and the differentials in rates
due to intensified selection after Qctober 1931 could be
shown from the basic cost of the successive issues floated in
many municipalities throughout the country. Four further
instances, chosen almost at random, of cities of different size,
should afford sufficient illustration. The accompanying tabu-
however, do not tell the full story because many
municipalities failed to dispose of bonds offered despite in-
creased interest rates, while others stayed out of the market
altogether, and others again had recourse to short-term
financing as a temporary expedient.
Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle.LOCAL FINANCING 307
DATE AMOUNT BASIC RATE
(in thousands) (per cent)
DETROIT, MICHIGAN
March 20, 1928 $17,272 4.066
November20, 1928 19,460 4.22
December5, 1929 24,266 4.446
May 12, 1930 20,350 4.415
November 21, 1930 19,692 4.4377
May tR, 1931 19,337 4.16
August 13, 1931 8,ooo 4.44
22,000 5.91
BUFFALO, NEWYORK
February6, 1929 $594 4.70
April 1, 1929 2,520 4.25
December9, 1929 3,590 4.09
April 7, 1930 2,880 4.00
September4, 1930 3,675 3.91
January 7, 1931 3,200 3.85
September 10, 1931 2,210 3.33
February24, 1932 1,790 4.93
June 15, 1932 4,000 4.68
October 5, 1932 4,000 3.78
January 5, 1933 3,000 3.08
May 11, 1933 4,000 6.oo
August 24, 1933 9,500 4.18
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
January 4, 1928 $15,000
March 5, 1928 7,500 3.86
November 19, 1928 5,000 4.06
December17, 1928 8,ooo 4.24
June 3, 1929 10,000 4.415
July 22, 1929 9,350 4.24
December2, 1929 12,976 4.25
April t6, 1930 3,884 3.90
July 7, 1930 15,000 4.128
Dec. 15, i6, 18, 1930 13,400 4.25
February27, i93i 15,000 4.12
October, 1931 4,038 4.75
November,'93' 4,851 4.75
December, 1931 4,054 4.75
January, 1932 179 4.75
February, 1932 17 4.75
March, 1932 2,000 4.75
June, 1932 174 5.00
July, 1932 926 5.00
August, 1932 i,86g 5.00
September, 1932 13,071 5.00PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
DATE AMOUNT BASIC RATE
(in thousands) (per cent)
P1-IILADELPFIIA, PENNSYLVANIA (cont.)
October, 1932 $5,999 5.00
June 12, 1933 1,750 5.00
July 21, 1933 1,250 5.00
August 10, 1933 2,736 5.00
August 31, 1933 170 5.00
PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND
Februaryi8, 1929 $2,000 4.31
November 20, 1929 3,000 4.35
May 8, 1930 2,000 4.11
December19, 1930 3,000 4.09
June 19, 1931 2,000 3.66
April 5, 1932 9,000 4.52
March 13, 1933 3,000 3.50
In 1931Philadelphia'scumulative deficit of bank loans, man-
damuses and bills totaled almost $i 8,ooo,ooo. To increasingly
critical investors this situation reduced the attractiveness of the
city's bond issues. In October 1931,whenmany cities were dispos-
ing of bonds at basic costs of little more than 4 per cent, Phila-
delphia had great trouble in marketing $15,000,000ofbonds at
4.75 per cent. In the late spring of 1932thecity had difficulty in
selling $20,000,000ofbonds even at 5 per cent. During 1932De-
troit engaged in no long-term financing and on February 15,1933
itdefaulted on its debt charges. Buffalo, on the other hand,
negotiated a loan of $4,000,000inOctober 1932ata basic cost
of 3.78 per cent, and in January 1933aloan of $3,000,000at3.08
per cent. But here, too, an offering of $4,790,000fiveper cent
bonds on February io, 1932didnot receive a single bid, and a
$4,000,000offeringon April 22,1933 sharedthe same fate. The
latter flotation was disposed of in May at a basic cost of 6 per cent.
CLASSIFICATION OF BOND ISSUES BY PURPOSE AND
GOVERNMENTAL DIVISION
The purposes for which municipal bonds have been issued
in recent years are of considerable interest. Tables 87 and
88 show that there is much variation from year to year inTABLE 87
PURPOSE OF MUNICIPAL BOND ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1924-1933
(in thousands)
PURPOSE 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 0
Watersupply $120,064 $105,864 $104,950 $62,173$90,694 $111,763$74,948$50,932 $36,889
Schools 57,799120,59159,55683,80256,62492,44359,16455,60823,603 10,214
Sewers 46,09469,24354,47959,804 50,285 71,323 72,925 42,997 26,446 38,191
Street improvement 90,979 112,587 99,543114,753114,534122,174111,597 73,016 42,308 13,271
Public utilities 34,92424,247 60,022 107,71276,208127,54348,043136,582 7,219 19,503 Z
Parks 14,243 8,826 7,431 6,37520,532io,66i 12,911 11,388 1,924 1,536
Public buildings,
hospitals, police and
fire departments 53,90028,67442,08546,96841,03145,54842,47435,13820,576 10,281 Z
Miscellaneous 310,133228,482283,514243,930219,136231,505187,556244,048246,619 412,285
Source: The Bond Buyer, Municipal Bond Sales
00
TABLE 88
PURPOSE OF MUNICIPAL BOND ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES,
EXCLUDING MUNICIPALITIES IN NEW YORK STATE, 1924-1933
(in thousands) z
PURPOSE 1924 1925 .1926 1927 1928 1929 '930 1931 1932 1933 Z
Watersupply $92,564$98,704$83,138$81,146$55,749$68,265$86,594$68,431$47,552 $34,804
Schools 45,03151,50450,861 50,541 29,883 39,491 46,79423,163 13,070 5,366
Sewers 41,72064,98449,321 54,10346,93465,31967,67939,93523,390 35,863
Street improvement 82,808101,399 88,55298,54598,513108,22696,74460,59933,730 10,885
Public utilities 15,36821,96229,194 26,416 8,652 16,48320,92424,582 7,032 i,686
Parks 12,996 6,719 6,660 4,918 19,939 9,518 11,399 10,938 1,720 1,536
Public buildings,
hospitals, police and
fire departments 48,64623,63036,25940,78637,64742,25639,22332,877 18,705 7,168
Miscellaneous ..216,559239,434208,190183,535200,228161,559147,525103,567 77,567
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the purposes of city issues, but Street improvements, the
building of schools and other public structures, the con-
struction of water supply systems and of sewers always
account for the bulk of the total sales. Issues of munici-
palities in New York State have been excluded in Table 88
because some of the classes shown in Table 87 are heavily
weighted by the large issues of New York City. This is espe-
cially true for public utilities, a large portion of the flota-
tions for which has consisted in recent years of long-term
borrowing by New York City for rapid transit purposes.
Total issues for school purposes are also somewhat distorted,
though in less degree, by New York's share.
As explained in note 3, the term 'municipal' has been
used throughout this chapter to cover bond issues of states,
counties, school and other districts, as well as of munici-
palities proper. The preponderating portion of total obli-
of thissortisalways put out by cities.The
accompanying tabulation,9 which givesthepercentages
accounted for by different civil divisions in the aggregate
SCHOOLCITIES, TOWNS,
YEAR STATES COUNTIES DISTRICTSVILLAGES, ETC. TOTAL
1926 9.57 14.97 12.62 62.84 100.00
1927 8.70 19.02 10.89 61.39 100.00
2928 11.49 20.00 g.i6 59.35 100.00
1929 11.17 15.29 8.75 64.99 too.oo
2930 15.95 iB.oi 8.27 57.77 100.00
2931 19.71 13.64 5.51 61.14 100.00
2932 23.09 13.09 3.27 60.57 100.00
2933 37.02 12.21 2.92 47.85 100.00
volumeof all bonds issued each year by local governments
throughout the country, shows that city bonds are half as
large again in volume as all other bonds issued. City and
school district bonds together constitute between two-thirds
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, State and Municipal Compendium,
1933, and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 19,1934.
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and three-quarters of the total, while if those counties which
are dominated by one large city were added the percentage
would be higher still.
The supply of state bonds has steadily increased in recent
years following a sharp decline during 1925—27 from the
total for the record year 1924. Even during the depression,
when all other local governmental units were curtailing their
borrowings, the volume of state bonds increased, as is indi-
cated in the accompanying tabulation.t° In 1928 the states
(in thousands)
YEAR HIGHWAY MISCELLANEOUS TOTAL
£927 $76,825 $37,934 $114,759
£928 71,598 159,593
1929 127,554 50,018 177,572
1930 140,645 80,797 221,442
193% 117,750 134,397 252,147
1932 78,250 198,049 276,299
1933 24,278 352,974 377,252
undertooka wide variety of public improvements; in 1929
and 1930 the increase was almost entirely due to the issu-
ance of highway bonds. The steady increase in the total
volume of state bonds during the succeeding three years is
only partly explained by investors' preference for this class
of municipals. The essential cause of the expansion was the
enlargement of relief issues. In 1932 and 1933 state borrow-
ing for emergency needs was augmented by RFC loans
amounting to In May 1933 relief issues were
stimulated further by an amendment to the RFC Act which
permitted the distribution of an additional $500,000,000
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. Al-
though one-half of this sum was to be granted outright to
states, the other half was to be given only on condition that
the states matched each relief dollar with three of their
own. In 1933, too, the PWA and RFC lent money to states
10TheBond Buyer, Municipal Bond Sales, 1g27—33.LOCAL FINANCING 313
for public works, but in comparison with the loans to cities
these emissions were of minor significance. The marked de-
dine in the volume of highway bonds during this three-year
period was a concomitant of the change in emphasis result-
ing from the above-mentioned exigencies of the depression.
In 1933, moreover, PWA grant allotments to states for road-
building and repair reduced the need to borrow forthis
purposeand helped preserve the tendency for states to rely
on gasoline tax revenues and Federal aid for their road-
building programs."
The total of county, school and other district bonds was
substantially reduced in1929. Roadbuilding activities of
counties in 1930 caused a rapid expansion in the bonds put
out by them, but in 1931and1932, in common with other
local units, excluding states, their borrowing contracted se-
verely. City, town and village issues, which had increased in
1929,fellsharply in the succeeding four years. Cities, unlike
states, did not receive very substantial aid from the RFC in
1932. According to reports of the RFC, it loaned to cities
approximately $i6,ooo,ooo for self-liquidating projects.12 In
1933theRFC expanded the volume of its bond purchases
and loaned $48,000,000 for self-liquidating projects to cities
and states. In addition to these loans the PWA in 1933
bought from cities about $280,000,000 of bonds. The tabu-
lationshows the aggregate volume of state and other local
bonds issued annually, 1926—33. The significant fact is that
the largest and most important class of local obligations, that
of municipalities, strictly defined, declined markedly after
1929, while such increases as occurred in bonds put out by
11In1932 nearly one-half of the states depended entirely on the gasoline tax
for their own road programs, according to Dr. Carl Shoup, in Current Prob.
lems in Public Finance.
12Theseloans were to both cities and states but virtually the entire sum
was expended for city bonds.
The Bond Buyer, Municipal Bond Sales, 1929—33.r











statesare accounted for chiefly by issues for road- and bridge-
building and relief purposes.
The net annual increase in the amount of municipal
bonds outstanding is found by deducting from the new
issues made each year the amount of old debt redeemed and
retired. Table 89 shows the gross annual new issues, the
volume of maturities and redemptions and the net annual
increase in the amount of municipal bonds outstanding
TABLE 8g





2 ISSUESRETIRED ADDITIONS TO DEBT
1923 $1,063,120 $234,480 $828,639
1924 1,398,953 261,521 1,137,433
1925 1,399,638 284,278 1,115,359
1926 1,365,057 337,539 1,027,519
1927 1,509,583 386,193 1,123,390
1928 1,414,785 455,966 958,819
1929 1,430,651 454,181 976,470
1930 1,487,313 488,196 999,117
1931 1,256,255 505,764 750,491
1932 849,480 526,082 323,398
1933 520,478 546,338 —25,860
Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle, State and Municipal Com-
pendium, 1933
1 Includesstates, cities, counties, etc.
2Thedifference in the gross amounts of new issues as they appear in this table from
the figures appearing in Table 86 isexplained by the difference in the gathering
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since1923. The net addition to debt in 1932 is probably
overestimated. Many large cities, either in an effort to re-
trench or unable to meet maturities because of curtailed
revenue, resorted to refunding. The Bond Buyer has esti-
mated that municipal flotationsspecifically described as
'refunding' rose from approximately $62,000,000 in 1931 to
more than $87,000,000 in 1932.
INFLUENCES TENDING TO CHECK MUNICIPAL
DURING DEPRESSIONS
The sharp decline in the aggregate volume of bond flota-
tions by municipalities in 1930 shows that though high
interest costs act as a deterrent, as in 1929, upon the contrac-
tion of new debt, low rates do not necessarily enlarge the
volume of borrowing unless other factors are also favorable.
Powerful tendencies of an opposite sort, to which depression
itself has given rise, may be actively at work. This was al-
ready the situation in large measure in 1930. Although faith
in municipal soundness temporarily enhanced the desir-
ability of bonds, local governments themselves were begin-
fling to curtail their borrowing.
TAX DELINQUENCIES
The only security behind municipal bond flotations is the
promise of the city to pay; this promise is in turn based on
the city's mandate to levy taxes.14 As pointed out above,
until 1931 investors were confident that the cities could
collect as well as levy taxes. In 1931, however, tax receipts
began to drop seriously. "A survey of all the Federal census
reports for 1931, available on February i,1933, discloses
that in 205 cities located instates the ratio of property
14Inthe case of state obligations the creditor cannot compel the levying of
the necessary tax to pay the debt.PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
tax receipts to tax levies increased from i 929 tO 1931 ini 8
states and decreased19 states."
During 1932 and 1933 tax delinquencies increased to such
an extent that many cities were operating with approxi-
mately three-quartersoftheircurrent taxlevies. The
accompanying tabulation, illustrating the trend in tax de-
CITY PERCENTAGE OF TAX DELINQUENCY YEAR ENDING
1930 '93' 1932 '933
New York 14.6 17.7 26.5 26.5
15.3 27.5 42.0 41.0
Philadelphia i6.6 21.3 25.8 27.2
Detroit io.8 17.2 25.0 34.6
Los Angeles 4.8 6.4 8.i 12.9
St. Louis 20.4 23.2 26.7 31.0
San Francisco 1.5 i.6 2.0 5.4
Buffalo .8 1.3 6.g 11.5
Cincinnati 5.6 7.3 11.1 10.1
Oakland 5.1 6.5 8.9
1Percentagesfor chicago are for levies of 1928,1929, 1930 and The1932levy
was not yet in collection at the time of this study.
linquency in selected cities,'6 indicates that Los Angeles,
San Francisco and Oakland, those municipalities in which
business activity (as reflected in indices of bank debits) was
least retarded, and Cincinnati, an especially well-adminis-
tered community, suffered least from non-payment of taxes.
Buffalo, another city with a fairly low rate of tax delinquency,
has in the past been hampered less by uncollected taxes than
have other large cities. Buffalo sells its unpaid taxes to tax buyers;
unsold taxes are purchased by the city from a special fund created
for the purpose. Prior to '93 1—32, 8o to 90 per cent of the city's
annual unpaid taxes were purchased by tax buyers; during the
last two fiscal years the city has, however, been obliged to pur-
chase most of these arrears.
The extremely high delinquency in Chicago is the result of
15TheInternal Debts of the United States, ed. by Evans Clark, p. 267.
10F.L. Bird, Four Year Trend in Tax Delinquency, National Municipal Re-
view, February 1934.LOCAL FINANCING 317
peculiar circumstances. The quadrennial assessment of 1927 was
so inequitable that in 1928 the Tilinois State Tax Commission
ordered a complete reassessment of real property in Chicago.
While this task, which took until the end of 1929, was being
accomplished, all tax collections were suspended. The upshot
of this reassessment was a reduction of over $400,000,000 rn the
assessed real estate valuations for 1928 from those of 1927. During
this period of suspended tax collections, each governmental body
had continued to spend money on an increasing scale from the
proceeds of the sale of tax anticipation warrants. This diminution
in assessed valuation, therefore, resulted in large deficits in vir-
tually every governmental unit of Cook County. Late in 1929
the Cook County Taxpayers' Warrant Trust was formed to buy
tax anticipation warrants and to sell 'certificates of interest' to
the public.'7 Tax collections were resumed in 1930 but by this
time the depression had already injured the paying ability of
many citizens.
Dissatisfaction with assessments continued despite the review
of 1928—29, and early in 1932 the Committee on Public Expendi-
tures was formed to unify government affairs. Despite these new
civic interests and attempts at adjustment, Cook County had a
floating debt of over $270,000,000 at the close of 1932.
With a shrinking revenue and the relatively greater diffi-
culty of maintaining tax rates at a high level (to raise them
would be still more difficult), and with an additional burden
often thrown upon them in the shape of emergency ex-
penditures to alleviate distress, city governments are not
unlikely to be reluctant to increase their outstanding indebt-
edness at such times and incur the added debt service
charges entailed. Tax delinquency, in particular on prop-
erty, may be less an indication of adverse economic con-
ditions than a reflectionof tax'strikes' and organized
opposition to payment on a possibly unjustifiable economic
"Facts drawnfromFinancial Dictators Replace Political Boss, by W. C.
Beyer, National Municipal Review, April 1933.TABLE 90
GENERAL PROPERTY TAX DELINQUENCIES
IN NINETEEN STATES
RANGE
DATE OF UNCOLLECTED OF PERCENT-
REPORTED AND DELINQUENT AGE DELIN-
STATE DELINQUENCY ASSESSMENT LEVY AMOUNT PERCENTAGE OFQUENCY
(in thousands) (in thousands) DELINQUENCY BY COUNTY
Arizona 6/30/33 $473,342 $18,815 23.89 3.8-39.6
California1 6/30/33 8,487,708 140,813 18,139 12.88 1.3-51.6
Colorado 11 12/31/33 1,284,2571 39,998 7,140 17.85 3.4-65.4Z
Georgia4 12/31/33 A 935,0431 4,675 . z
B714,869° 3,574 457 13.00 D.5-53.O —
Indiana 9/30/33 3,994,598° 108,986° 32,710 30.00 8.0-96.0
LouisiaDa 17 2/28/34 1,509,770 46,805 3,353 7.16 0.6-47.1
Massachusetts8 12/31/32 7,178,219 223,192 9,363 4.20 .0-10.7
MiChigan1° 6/30/33 5,499,4411 216,581 88,19810 40.72 10.1-92.3
MinDesota1 10/15/33 1,635,748° 108,214 23,309 21.54 4.3-68.9
Missouri1 A 4,171,6831 86,094 ... ... ...
B3,990,668° 83,425 20,136 24.00 8.0-54.0
MoDtana 1 12/31/33 A 375,2831 26,354 ... ... ...
B308,126° 21,402 4,259 20.00 2.0-64-50
NebraskaI 2/1/34 A 2,520,661' 49,589 ... ... ...
B2,374,154' 47,171 11,777 24-97 8.g-68.i
NeVada I ... 199,024° 4,668 375 8.0411 0.7-41.4
New Hampshire° 1/31/33 586,408 16,893 2,720 i6.gi 3.2-28.4
Ohio I 8/1/33 10,032,442' 202,251 50,526 25.00 4.5-39.5
Oregon1 10/5/33 41,994 18,380 44.00 33.5-82.0
Rhode Island 1
,. 1,382,189' 28,439 4,973 17.50 10.5-27.5
WashiDgton2 12/31/33 1,054,281 66444 ig,68i 29.61 13.1-46.1
Wyoming1 12/31/33 A 354,504° 9,330 -.. ... ..
B3o7,3i4° 8,095 605 7.5° 2.0-20.0A All Counties.
BCounties reported on tax delinquency.
1Countyand school levy; excludes municipal levies except com-
bined county-city levy of San Francisco, taxes on intangibles,
railroads and utilities.
Levies for state and local purposes.
Excludes municipal taxes.
State property levy; excludes taxes on public service corpora.
tions, professions and polls.
Excludes special assessments.
Delinquent taxes are added to current levy from year to year,
hence figures are on a cumulative basis, not comparable with other
states.
Excludes municipal taxes except New Orleans.
8Townand City levy.
Excludes railroads and certain utility levies.
10Computedon basis of data which included special assessments.
51Rateof delinquency may be about twice as high, as property
ofutilitiescomprises about'/2oftotalvaluation, and taxes
thereon generally paid.
Source: Compiled from current reports of Bureau of Census Division of Real Estate Taxation: General Property Tax
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basis. However,- such an attitude extends naturally from
refusal to pay taxes already levied to• a refusal to incur
more debt. In periods of industrial stagnation, and particu-
larly of declining real estate -values, the tax paying public
is likely to be not only keenly conscious of the burden of
local taxation but also sharply critical of, if not strenuously
opposed to, the assumption of further obligations, as indeed
to expanded expenditures in general. The explanation of
the marked decline noted above in the issuance of county,
city, town and district bonds during the depression, in con-
trast to the concurrent increase in state borrowing, is prob-
ably to be found partly in the fact that local bond issues
entail definite and direct increases in local taxation, whereas
state obligations are usually payable from indirect taxes such
as the gasoline tax, and are spread so thin or levied in such
manner as to be relatively less objectionable to the individual
taxpayer. During the post-War period the states in the
aggregate have been responsible for a much smaller propor-
tion of the citizen's tax burden than the cities. As a conse-
quence it has been relatively easier for them to secure the
support of voters in programs of large-scale borrowing dur-
ing the depression.
Despite reliance on numerous forms of taxation, states
have been seriously affected by general property tax delin-
quencies. This is indicated in the study made by the Division
of Real Estate Taxation of the Bureau of the Census. Table
go shows the delinquency rates in ig states. Fifteen states
that levy property taxes reveal very high delinquencies when
combined with local delinquent taxes, for the fourth year
of the depression. In other states, where local property taxes
only are levied, the existence of delinquency on this particu-
lar tax simply involves the state government in various
types of aid to localities. Even though the states may not be
heavily dependent on property taxation for revenue, theyLOCAL FINANCING 321
cannot avoid some strain on their own revenues when local-
ities experience financial stringencies. This is another reason
for the more extensive borrowing by state governments.
During the depression the states have been forced to resort
to three major types of assistance to localities: they h.ave
increased grants for local functions, they have assumed a
part of the financial burden of highway and school financ-
ing, and they have shared the revenue obtained from various
state-collected taxes, particularly income and inheritance
taxes, motor vehicle and gasoline taxes, and sales and liquor
taxes.18
BOND DEFAULTS
in the volume of municipal indebtedness in default
in respect of principal or interest rapidly increased. The
growing difficulty of collecting taxes has been discussed.
Failure of tax collections to cover both operating costs and
debt service had already manifested itself in Florida. But in
1930 to Florida were added the following states where
municipal insolvency existed in more or less serious degee: 19
theCarolinas, Texas, Tennessee, New Jersey, New York,
Michigan, Massachusetts. The inability of Chicago, Cook
County and various districts in that region to meet their tax
notes has already been dwelt upon above, and though the
situation in this instance was due in large part to peculiar
local circumstances of a rather different nature, they were
intensified by conditions created by the general business
depression. Elsewhere in the Middle West and on the Pa-
cific Coast many drainage, irrigation and special improve-
ment districts found themselvesintrouble, and some
Bulletin No. 6, April SharingTaxes with Local Governments, Gen-
era! Welfare Tax League.
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defaults on general obligations issued by counties and cities
occurred.
In 1931, 1932 and '933 defaults continued unabated. Even
in 1931 pràbably every state had had some defaults. Accord-
ing to the Municipal Securities Committee of the Investment
Bankers Association of America, the wave of bank failures
involving losses of municipal deposits and the general tight-
ening of the bond market were largely responsible for the
accelerated rate of temporary defaults ini 931
It has recently been estimated that during 1930—33fromiooo
to 2000 American cities defaulted on their debts.21 Of a total
defalcation of approximately $1,000,000,000, $550,000,000 are the
obligations of districts in and around Chicago and Detroit, the
latter city having first failed to meet payments in February 1933
as a result of Governor Comstock's closing of Michigan banks.
Municipal insolvency was most prevalent in Florida, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Michigan, Kentucky, Missouri and
Tennessee.22 States, too, suffered from this epidemic inability to
pay: in 1933 three states, Arkansas, Louisiana and South Carolina,
were known to be in default.
Dr. Wylie Kilpatrick,in a Study of State and Local
Debt,23 points out that the types of security that have been
largely responsible for defalcation are special assessment
bonds and short-term loans issued in anticipation of taxes.
The rising wave of tax delinquency and the frequent lack
of legal provision for funding short-term paper have led to
the amassing of large floating debts which cannot be paid at
maturity. The use of special assessment bonds, which grew
in volume with rapid real estate development, have con-
"Ibid., 1931.
21Commercialand Financial Chronicle, January 1934.
S. Shanks, Jr., The Present State of Municipal Credit, National Municipal
Review, February '934.
The Internal Debts of the United States, pp. 271, 272.LOCAL FINANCING
tributeddirectly and indirectly to defalcation. During the
depression the rate of delinquency on assessment taxes has
been even higher than the rate of property tax delinquency.
Since non-payment of assessments may result in confiscation
of property by the assessment lien holder, the property
owner, facing the loss of his property on this account, has
no incentive to continue paying either his assessment or his
other taxes, and thus the possibility of default is spread to
other types of bond.24
The financial difficulties encountered by local governments
during the depression have had an interesting development. The
increased reliance on banks for aid, several instances of which
have been cited in this chapter, noticeably expanded the amount
of municipal bonds in bank portfolios. The accompanying tabu-
lation reveals this quite clearly.25 These figures, taken from An-
nual Reports of the Comptroller of Currency, are probably an
underestimate due to the inadequate manner in which records are
(in inilitonS)
.1927 $1724 .1930 $1702
.1928 .i8go £931 2266
1929 1746 1932 2802
24TheMunicipal Bankruptcy Bill, recently passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives and in a slightly modified form by the Senate, is another illustra-
tion of the general policy of the Roosevelt administration to aid local
governmental units in the solution of emergency problems. The enactment
of this bill would make it possible for insolvent municipal governments and
their creditors to decide upon a plan of refinancing and settlement. Upon
the acceptance of the readjustment plan by 51percent of the holders of
securities, the agreement might be approved by the Federal courts under
their constitutional powers to deal with bankrupts. Before confirming the
execution of any such agreement the court must have received the written
consent of two-thirds of the holders in amount of each class of securities and
of three-fourths in amount of all creditors. The House bill differs from the
Senate bill in that it requires the consent of onlyper cent of the creditors
to petition court approval; petition may or may not include a plan of re.
adjustment. Furthermore, itis not necessary to receive the signed approval
ofper cent of all holders of securities to execute the refinancing measure.
25Willisand Chapman, The Banking Situation, p. 837.324 PLANNiNGPUBLIC WORKS
both kept and reported in banks that are not members of the
Federal Reserve system. The growth is more significant in view
of the fact that heavy purchases of Federal securities have greatly
expanded total bond portfolios.
CHANGES IN ASSESSED VALUES OF PROPERTY
Conditions of general business depression affect munici-
pal expenditures through the assessed valuation of real
estate in a twofold manner. First, the base on which the tax
levy falls, and which yields the preponderating portion of
the current revenue of local governments, is narrowed or at
best expands less rapidly than in periods of prosperity. Sec-
ond, if it is narrowed or enlarged at a slower rate than usual,
counties and cities are likely to be brought into closer prox-
imity to their debt limits, which are almost invariably fixed
at some percentage of the assessed value of taxable property.
Instances of cities which found themselves encroaching dan-
gerously upon their debt limits already in 1930 have been
cited above; and although this was not the case in New York,
that city affords an instructive example of the financial
embarrassment caused by an increase in assessed valuations
which proved to be smaller than had originally been ex-
pected and reckoned upon.
Furthermore, the attenuation of the revenue base, if ac-
companied by a general drop in total tax receipts, increases
the prominence of debt service in the budget and thus dis-
courages the obligation of new debt. A recent survey made
by the New York State Bureau of Municipal Information
of 6o cities in New York State 26indicatesthat funded debt
legally chargeable against the io per cent constitutional debt
limit of New York State increased from $1,212,000,000 to
approximately $1,670,000,000; a rise ofper cent from
Report No. 1477,ComparativeAnalysis of Funded Debt, Assessed Valuation
and Borrowing Capacity of New York State Cities, 1925—7934.LOCAL FINANCING
January i, 1925 to January i, 1934. Excluding New York
City, the expansion is even greater—58 per cent. Since there
are numerous methods by which the constitutional limit can
be exceeded, this estimate is probably very conservative. The
mounting debt has meant that larger portions of the tax
dollar are expended for interest and principal payment.
Further datagatheredby the Bureau revealed that funded
debt for these cities had declined 2 per cent from January
1, 1933 to January 1, 1934; excluding New York City, 1 per
cent. This reduction has been achieved by refunding and
the curtailment of new obligations.
DECREASING REVENUES FROM VARIABLE STATE TAXES
After the World War, the state governments tended to
rely more and more heavily for their current revenues on
other forms of levy than the general property tax. Some of
these taxes have been characterized as 'variable' because of
their fluctuations as revenue producers at different phases
of the business cycle. The trend towards the new tax forms
is evident in the tabulation of the percentage distribution
TAXES
BUSINESS SUBVENTIONS,
AND NON- SPECIALGRANTS, AND
PERSONAE. BUSINESS PENSION ALL
YEAR PROPERTYSPECIAL LICENSEAND CHARGES ASSESSMENTSOTHER
1922 30.0 i6.g 26.3 o.8 9.5 16.5
1923 28.3 17.5 27.2 1.4 9.5 i6.i
1924 25.7 i6.6 31.8 1.7 9.8 14.4
1925 24.1 15.9 34.3 2.1 9.7 13.9
1926 22.7 16.2 37.2 1.7 8.4 13.8
1927 21.7 17.2 38.6 1.5 7.9 13.1
1928 19.7 17.5 40.5 7.3 13.2
1929 17.0 19.5 41.6 1.5 7.4 13.0
1930 15.4 i8.g 44.9 1.2 6.7 12.9
1931 i6,o 16.7 43.6 1.1 10.4 12.2
Polls franchise taxes for highway privileges, rents and interest, earnings of general
departments and public utility enterprises.326 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
of revenue receipts by source from i922to 1931,27Thede-
clining importance of property taxation is clearly shown;
special taxes, defined in the Financial Statistics of States as
corporation, income, inheritance and other specific and di-
rect taxes, show an increase until 1930, while business and
non-business license taxes, including motor vehicle levies
and general and special sales taxes, have increased strikingly.
The use of direct, or special, taxes was favored during the
post-War boom because of their highly satisfactory yield.
The so-called 'license' taxes were made up in large part of
motor vehicle and gasoline levies, which were turned in
normal times chiefly to the account of road programs, the
most important construction activity of the states as a whole.
Subventions and grants were declining as a source of revenue
until increased Federal-aid road grants ini 931 reversed the
direction. But the variable nature of the 'special' group dealt
a blow to the states in 1930 and 1931. In the following two
years the situation became acute: the general property tax,
which though of declining importance had been relied upon
as failed as a revenue producer in the face of
reduced assessments and growing delinquency.28 At the same
time, the demands on the states for aid to localities grew
heavier. As current revenues declined and approached the
level of ordinary expenditures, the opposition of voters to
large-scale borrowing programs increased.Forty-sixstate
legislatures convened iniin regular or special session
to wrestle with the problem of raising revenues. In general,
two, steps were taken to solve this dilemma: attempts were
made to increase the adequacy of existing revenue by re-
trenchment of expenditures, and new forms of revenue
(mentioned above) were more widely adopted to supple-
"Financial Statistics of States.
The material which follows is drawn largely from an article by Professor
Harold M. Groves, reprinted from the Tax Magazine, March 1934.LOCAL FINANCING 327
ment the property tax. Of the sixteen states now using the
sales tax, or the comparable gross income tax, fifteen adopted
thetaxafter thirteen. the year
Thirteenadditional states turned to the net income tax in
some form, making a total of twenty-nine that have this tax.
Liquor taxes, imposed in thirteen states from December i,
to March i, addedto the list. Increases in rates
of taxes were out of the question in most states: Oregon
alone increased the gasoline tax rate in 1933,Arkansasin
the early part of i 934; the inheritance and personal income
surtax were increased in Montana, and a special levy on
personal and corporate income for relief purposes was em-
ployed in New York State. The property tax collapsed as a
revenue producer; the vigorous movement for relief from its
burden still continues and several states have responded by
extending dates of payment, by removing penalties, and by
numerous other devices calculated to relieve the property
tax payer.2°
The rapid changes taking place in state tax systems have
a twofold significance for proposals of public construction
expansion in depression periods. First, as far as the present
era is concerned, it is evident that the progressive forms of
taxation •now in use are not sufficient to maintain state
finances in a condition conducive to additional borrowing
programs during depressions. To rely on localities for relief
of unemployment in such a period is to do practically noth-
ing. Even after the Federal government came to the aid of
the localities, it was the outright grants of funds, rather than
the loans, which were rapid in their effects (see Ch. V and
IX). The second consideration is of long-run interest: advo-
cates of public works programs financed by borrowing, and
paid for from general taxation rather than from regressive
For a description of the steps taken by a wealthy state with respect to
reallocation of taxes, see the Section Ofl California in Ch. VI.328 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
tolls on self-liquidating projects, have found themselves faced
with the very situation they wished to avoid. It has been
estimated 30thatby 1932 about four-fifths of local revenues
(state and municipal) were derived from taxes regressive in
effect. A virtual ioo per cent increase in new sales taxes and
an increase of less than 50 per cent in new net income taxes
since 1930 is ample evidence (in view of the tendency of tax
legislation, once written, to remain on the statute books) that
the loans received from the Federal government in 1932 and
1933—34 may ultimately be paid for in large part by the
lower-income groups, asis claimed to be true of tolls.
Whether the present trend continues, or whether reforms of
the progressive tax system will relieve the situation, the fact
remains that the question of the consistency of the fiscal
revenue system with the ultimate aims of public works ex-
pansion has been raised to considerable prominence in the
last few years.
CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF LOCAL TAXATION
Widely Varying practices in assessing taxable property and
other local differences make any accurate comparison of the
burdens on taxpayers of different cities almost impossible.
An interesting attempt, however, has been made annually
during the last eleven years by the Detroit Bureau of Gov-
ernmental Research to compute comparable figures showing
total taxes levied by city, school, county and state authorities
in a great number of cities throughout the country. This is
done by calculating the tax rate in dollars per $iooo of the
assessed valuations of real and personal property subject to
taxatjon, and correcting these figures by the estimated ratio
that the assessed bears to the true valuations of property.
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The results for some seventeen selected cities for 1928—33
aregiven in Table 91. A considerable range of variation is
clearly shown.
TABLE 91
TAX RATES OF SELECTED CITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES COMPARED, 1928_19331
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
NewYork City $23.88 $23.21 $24.30$24.48 $24.12 $21.87
Chicago 19.40 19.40 ig.o6 22.76 24.94 27.20
Philadelphia 25.65 25.96 24.08 24.64 24.98 24.98
Detroit 21.74 21.16 23.14 27.09 31.69 29.02
Los Angeles 20.75 21.30 17.12 21.35 16.97 19.55
Cleveland w.oo 25.30 20.96 21.72 22.08 23.46
St.Louis 19.43 18.34 18.83 17.62 18.97 20.55
Boston 25.92 25.20 27.72 28.35 35.50 32.80
San Francisco 15.05 15.00 15.35 15.35 17.82 15.31
Buffalo 25.08 26.64 27.36 26.16 24.67 21.77
Cincinnati 22.14 19.44 21.60 19.89 20.70 21.96
Newark 38.30 38.00 39.40 39.80 30,40 22.96
Indianapolis 21.12 21.60 22.64 22.24 25.11 25.38
Rochester 24.31 24.40 24.01 24.68 26.22 25.66
St. Paul 21.59 21.80 21.92 21.62 22.46 27.93
Birmingham 15.12 15.12 15.12 15.12 14.40 14.40
Albany 26.88 21.80 24.38 24.84 28.01 22.83
Source: Comparative Tax Rates of Cities, an annual compilation by C. E.
Rightor and the Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research, published each
year in the December number of the National Municipal Review.
'All figures represent taxratein dollars per $1000ofassessed valuation, corrected
by estimated ratio that the latter bears to the true valuation of property,in order
to give the estimated real and comparable tax rate for all cities. Figures are for total
taxes levied by city, school, County and state authorities.
Though year-to-year comparisons cannot be made with
confidence, owing to inadequate and changing estimates of
the probable ratio of assessed to true valuations of property,
the general upward tendency of taxes until 1933 is estab-
lished beyond reasonable doubt.
Although it is not possible to posit an absolute correlation
between diminishing valuations and mounting tax rates
during the depression, an indication of this tendency is per.330 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
tinent because suggestive. The accompanying tabulation
CITY 1930 1931 1932
Philadelphia $27.75 $27.38 $27.75
Detroit 27.23 30.10 35.21
Los Angeles 42.80 42.70 43.50
Cleveland 26.20 27.15 27.60
Boston go.8o 31.50 35.50
Indianapolis 28.30 27.80 27.9O
St. Paul 27.40 27.02 28.08
shows the trend of tax rates in seven large cities during the
three-year period beginning with 1930. These particular
cities have been chosen because they experienced an abso-
lute decrease in assessed valuations rather than a diminished
rate of increase. It is apparent from this sample that the tax
rate was manipulated to compensate in some measure for
the attenuated tax base. The consequences of the increases
in the tax burden, in so far as they relate to public works,
are very clear. In view of the strong and not unjustifiable
opposition offered by the tax paying public and by organized
real estate interests to rising tax rates in periods of depres-
sion, and in view also of the relatively greater difficulty of
coflecting taxes, municipal authorities are disinclined to
expand their building programs beyond essential require-
ments at such times, whether the improvements are to be
financed from current revenue or by borrowing. The down-
ward revision in valuations and tax rates which occurred in
'933, while still not universal, was undoubtedly an effort to
curb tax delinquency and appease irate tax payers. Whether
this shrinkage will continue for any length of time is dubious,
since retrenchment in current expenditures is limited and
since depression expedients for economy in permanent in-
debtedness are in large part merely deferments.LOCAL FINANCING 331
DEBT LIMITS
Both the form and content of constitutional limitations
upon thedebt-incurringpoweroflocalgovernments,
whether city, county, or special administrative district, show
great variation from state to state alike in the restrictions
laid upon the purposes for which debt may be incurred, its
amount, the amount of the tax levy which may be used for
debt payment, and even the form of borrowing. This multi-
plicity of legislative provisions cannot be adequately sum-
marized. Despite the great variety, however, in the restric-
tions imposed, the fact remains that practically alllocal
governmental divisions are limited in their capacity to bor-
row by more or less rigid constitutional provisions, and that
these debt limits are usually computed upon a basic per-
centage of the assessed value of real estate.
The general effect of the changes in assessments on these
margins prior to and during the depression may be illustrated
by data furnished by the New York State Bureau of Munici-
pal Information in the study mentioned earlier in this chap-
ter. On January 1, 1933 the total debt margin of the 6o cities
examined was $756,000,000 as compared with $231,000,000
on January i, On January i, 1934 this margin had
dropped to $666,ooo,00o, $90,000,000 less than in the pre-
ceding year. The total debt margin, exclusive of New York
City, demonstrates equally clearly the serious shrinkage in
borrowing capacity during 1933:from $155,000,000 Ofl
January i, 1933 to $144,000,000 on January 1, 1934. Addi-
tional testimony of the serious handicap of attenuated bor-
31The figure given for 1933isnot meant to represent the peak in total
borrowing margin. The Bureau's figures cover only three dates: January t,
1925 andJanuary iof andi934, the beginnings of the fourth and fifth
years of the depression. The data do, however, roughly indicate the large
expansion of borrowing capacity in the pre-depression. period.332 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
rowing margins is furnished by the inability of many cities
and towns to borrow from the PWA.32
Limitations upon borrowing by state governments take
a different form., but usually involve a lengthy and time-
consuming procedure. In only ten states can debt be incurred
by legislative approval; in fifteen a majority vote of the
electorateisrequired;intwenty-threeaconstitutional
amendment is necessary. Certain exemptions from these re-
quirements are found: in forty-three states the government
may borrow to "repel invasion or suppress insurrection";
in thirty-nine states borrowing, under various restrictions, is
permitted to meet casual deficiencies; and in twelve itis
permitted to pay existing debt. Other forms of limitation
on debt exist; among them the requirement that provision
for service of the debt be made and that the debt maturities
be for no more than certain specified periods of years. Al-
though there is no necessary correlation between rigidity of
restrictions and the present credit status of a state, these legal
provisions are bound to produce a lag between the impact
of depression and financial relief through borrowing, even
if they do not altogether inhibit expansion of state bond
issues.33 Cities and counties in some states• are also under
certain circumstances required to submit proposed bond
issues to the electorate for its approval. For a variety of
reasons this approval is far from being accorded as a matter
of course, and it frequently happens that projected public
improvements cannot be undertaken because of the rejec-
tion at the hands of the voters of the bond issue needed to
finance their cost.
See Appendix C for a discussion of borrowing margins of specific cities and
their relation to PWA loans.
The material above is drawn from a detailed table prepared by Mr. L.
Ecker, and published in the National Tax Association Bulletin, March 1934.